SECURE Project - Security of Energy Considering its Uncertainty, Risk and Economic implications

WP 5.7 Development and application of methodology for assessing impacts of severe accidents and terrorist threat on energy security

Objectives

  • State-of-the-art comparative assessment of severe accidents in major energy chains
  • Development and applications of methodology for the assessment of the terrorist threat to major energy infrastructures
  • Risk aversion in accident risk assessment

Participants: PSI, FEEM, LEI, JRC

Description of work

Task 1: Severe Accidents

 Lead: PSI; LEI, JRC

1. Further developments of the severe accident database

The database ENSAD (Energy-related Severe Accident Database) established and maintained at PSI will be used to assess severe accident risks of selected full energy chains. The current status of ENSAD provides an excellent starting point to build upon. Since ENSAD is utilizing a multitude of primary information sources whose contents are verified, harmonized and merged within a relational database framework, it clearly outperforms other approaches based on single or a limited number of information sources. ENSAD provides a comprehensive coverage of severe, energy-related accidents and their technical aspects. The historical experience compiled in ENSAD allows the users to make coherent analyses tailored to their specific needs.

The intended further developments include an update of the historical experience of severe accidents covering the selected technologies addressed within the SECURE framework. This ranges from fossil energy chains (e.g. coal, oil and natural gas) to hydro, nuclear and selected renewables. For this purpose information sources already used in the past will be searched, but also new ones will be considered to further enhance the completeness and reliability of ENSAD.  

2. Investigation of trends and implications for future developments

Based on the updated ENSAD content, analyses will be performed for the current situation, but additionally trends and implications for future developments will be investigated. For the latter part, the estimations will employ extrapolations based on historical trends and taking into account potential changes of technologies in the future (e.g., efficiency or envisioned import pattern changes, etc).


3. Methodology for parameterised simplified Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)

For nuclear power new results are needed to account for site dependence and use of advanced designs. A framework for the simplified Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA) will be further advanced and implemented. Such an approach can benefit from earlier developments. The intention is to use results primarily from publicly available documents for the relevant designs (subject to adjustments based on engineering judgement) and conduct simplified probabilistic consequence analyses based on the knowledge that few factors drive the results. Since a complete set of source terms will not be available for the selected advanced design(s), extrapolations based on engineering judgement will be employed.

To the extent possible, a simplified PSA approach will also be implemented for hydro power. This includes the coupling between historical accident frequencies and location-specific factors driving the consequences.

4. Generation of quantitative accident indicators for selected technologies

Severe accidents will be quantitatively evaluated by generating a number of consequence indicators for selected technologies. Generally, various types of indicators differ in their completeness and accuracy. For example, fatalities comprise a more reliable indicator, superior to injured or evacuated persons because often the severity of an injury or the duration of an evacuation is not reported. Other indicators are only applicable to specific energy chains, e.g. release of hydrocarbons for oil spills or contaminated area for nuclear.

5. Qualitative analysis of indirect impacts of accidents on the energy sector

Besides the purely physical effects of severe accidents, a variety of indirect effects can occur, including environmental concerns (e.g., oil spills), social impacts due to supply disruption (e.g., pipeline explosion), evacuation of a large number of people (e.g., gas releases), acceptance problems of specific technologies due to extremely large maximum credible consequences or high accident frequencies, potential social conflicts among stakeholders (e.g., oil companies and local tribe communities in developing countries), or effect of a nuclear accident on the nuclear industry. Such effects will be discussed with view to the impacts they may have on the security of supply.

Task 2: Terrorist Threat

Lead: PSI

1. Development of structured methodology addressing feasibility, likelihood and expected consequences of successful attacks

No practical approach to the analysis of the terrorist threat to industrial installations is available in the open literature. Within this task a relatively simple but defensible approach will be established by addressing a number of key questions on the object selection, means, vulnerabilities, counter measures and consequences of a successful attack. The methodology will combine detailed knowledge of critical energy infrastructure, expert judgment and consequence assessment based on past occurrences of severe accidents (not terrorist-related) and simplified PSA.

2. Applications to selected energy systems

The methodology will be applied to a number of critical objects. The selection will consider the attractiveness of the infrastructure as objects for a potential attack as well as the magnitude of consequences in case of success. Restrictions need to be applied with regard to the publication of results of Task 2.

Task 3. Allowing for Risk Aversion in Accident Risk Assessment

Lead: FEEM

This task will draw upon the methodological developments of Task 3 of Work Package 1 “Foundations of energy security in risk analysis”.  The use of a realistic model for the computation of risk premiums can prove particularly useful in the case of accidents and terrorist threats to energy supply. In these cases the public perception of the risks involved is likely to be reflected in pressure on policymakers through public opinion. In certain circumstances this may cause situations of local or national opposition to energy vectors perceived as particularly risky, precluding the adoption of specific policy option and thus worsening security of supply problems. Typical examples are the opposition to LNG installations or nuclear power plants. 
Building on the qualitative analysis of Task 1.5 and on Task 2.2 of this WP, this task will apply the methodology developed in WP1 to some selected scenarios of low probability, high consequences accidents and terrorist threats. The risk premiums thus computed will provide a range of additional implicit costs that policymakers should take into considerations when weighting various policy options to tackle security of supply issues.  These premiums can also be compared with estimates of WTP to avoid energy insecurity as obtained in WP2. 

Workpackage 5.7 is carried out under the co-ordination of PSI

Seventh Framework Programme

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